The Future of the Republika Srpska
3 Scenarios for Assumption-based planning
Michael Jandl, 23.8.1997
Levels of variables 1-6
H: high
M: medium
L: low
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internal cohesion | H: power structures remain intact, all 3 nationalist parties stay in power, Plavsic removed or marginalized, Indicted War Criminals (IWCs) are further shielded from SFOR | L: intense power struggles in RS, both BL and Pale retain strong power basis, in H-B and in Fed., local and regional frictions --> extreme scenario : Banja Luka area breaks away from RS, parts of Fed. declare autonomy, Fed. breaks up | M: moderate parties gain ground in local elections, civil society restrains politics, IWCs first marginalized, then extradited to IWCT (or Karadzic quits with a deal) |
political-military stability | L: extremists and military gain strength, want territorial gains, pol. disputes (Brcko, Mostar,..) escalate, violations of DA, Fed. breaks up ?! or RS internallly weak ---> Fed. starts war, SFOR pulls out | L-M: RS army intervenes in power struggle FOR Plavsic, SFOR too, RS militarily weakened but SFOR deters any Fed./Bosniac agression, Serb hardliners marginalized/removed, Karadzic ousted, Pale faction boycotts DA | M: stable military balance, central institutions bring results and gain in influence and strenght, increasing cooperation, Federation works well!! (Mostar reunites,...) |
regional/national/group socio-economic stability | L: dialectic/uneven development of Fed (rapid growth, int'l investment) and RS (poor, no int'l aid, high Unempl.) - polarization in RS in pragmatic and nothing-to-loose factions, tensions within RS escalate | M: medium growth and reconstruction in Fed. even less in RS, donors gradually lose interest, pragmatics around Plavsic trade concessions for aid, BL becomes quasi-autonomous, rapprochement to Croatia (trade links) and Milosevic (needs int'l backing of his power gamble against Montenegro !) | H: Fed: fast rate of int'l aid and investment, high growth, lowers UE, RS gets more aid and reconstruction, Plavsic consolidates power across RS, Fed./RS- both can demobilize, new houses for DPs |
inclusiveness of political-cultural institutions | L: RS even more divided, power with Pale mafia, central gov't boycotted, divided administration in 3, no trade, no exchange of information, no returns, Fed (Mostar) stays divided | M: Plavsic wins power-struggle with backing of RS army/ police factions, plus SFOR intervention, remains weak and easy to blackmail, no major concessions, central gov't struggles along in solving some disputes, few returns, little exchange between entities, 1-2 common newspapers, TV,.. | H: central presidency works, implements common citizenship, freedom of movement, right to return, free trade, comon currency, local elections in Sept, RS elections in October, common political parties, free media, common flag and symbols, license plates, ambassadors |
armed/violent conflict | H: new fighting erupts -possibly triggered by outside events in Sandjak, Kosovo, Serbia, Eastern Slavonia or inside forces: RS/Fed for Brcko - Fed over Mostar, Bosniacs/RS - for new military (un)balance, Milosevic pushes hardliners to remove Plavsic and go for war to survive in Yugoslavia | M: fighting between factions of RS, BL faction wins, Fed. stays - uneasy - together, meanwhile radical elements, special paramilitary forces provoke violent clashes between entities, some parties resort to terrorist acts, SFOR more involved, more partial, more targeted, too weak to prevent clashes | L: military confidence building measures (OSCE Vienna, Budapest frameworks) work, confinement of weapons, demilitarization, demobilization, contentuous issues resolved through court, non-violent means |
concern/engagement of int'l community | L: US pulls out in mid-1998, SFOR greatly weakened, some int'l (EU) presence remains, UN missions face cut-backs, IPTF non-effective, no reforms of police forces in RS, low int'l aid, attention turns to other events in the region (Montenegro, Macedonia,) and outside EU | H: US stays committed to NATO and EU, keeps up SFOR strenght, EU pours further money into ill-fated projects, gets few concessions, some IWC apprehended | M: SFOR gradually reduced, IPTF and int'l assistance expanded, EU increases efforts and is more coherent, regional developments favourable, IWCs tried and human rights records established, int'l truth commission starts process of true reconciliation |
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Winners | IWCs, war-lords, nationalist elites, war profiteers, embargo busters, locally installed elites, nationalist opposition in RS, Fed., Serbia, Croatia, Kosovo, Sanjak | leadership of nationalist parties,
military in all entities, Serbia, Croatia, agents of destabilization -
paramilitary troops, employees of int'l organizations
Milosevic, Serbia |
moderates in all entities, opposition leaders and parties, newly elected local leaders, mayors, general pop., new businesses, employees, int'l community, UN, EU, NATO |
Losers | Milosevic, moderates in all entities, Serbia, Croatia, int'l community, UN, EU, new businesses, refugees, general pop. | moderates in all entities, int'l community, UN, EU, refugees and DP s general pop. | IWCs, war-lords, nationalist elites, war profiteers, locally installed elites, nationalist opposition in RS, Fed. Serbia, Croatia, Kosovo, Sanjak, Milosevic |
Barriers | int'l community in the field at
risk (attacks and hostage taking)
int'l reluctance to commit even more troops, SFOR/UN pulls out, shifts to "containment" power structures remain intact, i.e.old leaders won't listen |
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Opportunities | internal resistance to renewed escalation - |