Levels of variables 1-6: H: high, M: medium, L: low
 

Variable/Scenario	Scenario A: "All-Out WAR"	Scenario B "Protracted Guerilla"	Scenario C "Negotiations"
internal cohesion	H: further polarization of Serbian-K.Albanian pop.: united behind Milosevic/nationalists resp. UCK/pro-independence factions marginalize Rugova&Co	L: Milosevic under political pressure from left+right --> tough line, but unchecked paramilitaries; UCK splits along Clan-lines, unchecked by Rugova ---> not negiotiable	M: Milosevic under pol. pressure but retains power to navigate; UCK builds political leadership or comes to terms with Rugova
political-military stability	L: escalation into all-out war, 500-1000 deaths/week; goals: eradication of UCK, full independence	L-M: protracted fighting over strategic roads/towns/areas + resources, some 100 deaths/week, military calculations prevent escalation	M-H: establishment of stable "zones of control" of Serb/K.Alb. sides; "fortification" of no-go zones; ethnic cleansing, sporadic raids with scores dead; pending pol. solutions
regional/national/group socio-economic stability	L: increased support of UCK from Albania, Macedonia, Mont., Mac. disintegrates, Mont. secedes !	M: Mont. remains stable but contra Milosevic's war - no Mont. recruits, continued support of UCK from Alb.+ Mac.	H: Mont. accomodates to Milosevic's line, Mac. stabilizes, Albania withdraws support from UCK
inclusiveness of political-cultural institutions	L: democr. opposition marginalized in Serbia, totalitarian structure, orth. church radicalizes - parallel institutions in Kosovo cemented and taken over by UCK	M: cracks in Serbian politics --> mounting opposition movement, Milosevic loses parts of civil society/army/ business,.. - UCK -unable to win broader political acceptance - loses some support	H: anti-war movement in Serbia; pragmatists gain power; pressure builds to start autonomy talks - UCK comes under "civil control" as army of a future state with pol. leadership
armed/violent conflict	H: high intensity conflict/ heavy weapons/ with army and strong UCK	M-H: both JNA and UCK lack decisive military power - uncontrolled Serbian paramilitaries and fragmented UCK fight nasty guerilla	L-M: Milosevic controls param., police + JNA used for "surgical strikes"; UCK under unified command with professional mil. leadership
concern/engagement of int'l community	M: NATO establishes PREDEP around Serbia (with/without UNSC, Russia,..)	L: UNSC/NATO/EU split, weak + mixed signals, zic-zac course, credible threats to prevent widening of war	H: EU+US build strong bargaining positions for mediated settlement
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Winners	radical UCK leaders, irredentists everywhere Serbian paramilitaries +war-lords, Seselj, Milosevic?, independent Mont.??	local K.Alb. clan + UCK leaders, war-lords, Serbian top-army? Milosevic + cronies, smugglers,..	democratic opposition in Serbia, Rugova &Co Mac. + Mont. gov't, Balkan states, EU, USA
Losers	general population of Serbia, K.Albanians, Rugova, democratic opposition in Serbia, Mac., EU, US, refugee-receiving countries	Milosevic ?? Mont. under pressure?? Serb.+K.Alb. long-term refugees, business in Serbia under sanctions, Serb. population	irredentists everywhere Serbian paramilitaries +war-lords, radicals in UCK and K.Alb. local clan leaders
for conflict-resolution:
Barriers	high casualties and increased stakes lock adversaries in continuing escalation, inability for decisive defeat but continual misperception	continuation of war-efforts requires radicalized pol. climate in Serbia + among K.Albanians; crack-down on democr. oppositions; heightened nationalism; huge propaganda machines	fragmentation of K.Albanian clans + UCK; feeble unified leadership; --> how to implement any negotiated settlements; established "facts" (ethnic cleansing), continuing irredentism
Opportunities	Alb. irredentism threatenes widening of conflict ---> containment becomes overriding int'l goal !!	long-term ruin of Serbian economy; pol. instability; succesful coup !!; "starving" of UCK+K.Alb. population -->deals	Milosevic cannot win but must not loose --> may want to win time, UCK infighting+defeats -->loose credibility and support with K.Alb.
FOR (Democracy in) MONTENEGRO:
Barriers	direct spillovers: refugees, UCK bases, Albanian threats; within FRY: Serbian crackdown, army establishes martial law; within Mont.: radicalized Serbian, Alb. and Muslim (Sandjak) minorities, Milosevic's cronies,..	continued isolation, burdens of refugees, spillovers of guerilla activities, ruined economy, poverty, polarization within Mont. politics; threats of JNA intervention; little room for maneuver within FRY	Serbian hardliners/ nationalists/ Milosevic not tied up in Kosovo, need to re-assert power and influence in Mont., Mont. deputies more important for Milosevic, int'l community might sacrifice Mont. for "detente" in Kosovo
Opportunities	militarily: reduced risks for total independence, under shield of NATO/support of int'l community	increased strategic importance for NATO, int'l community, int'l aid, pro-Serbian faction slowly looses support	to gain strong bargaining position with int'l community ? as anchor of stability, to retain moderate course and distribute the gains evenly

Other possible scenarios are not considered as some of them are quite unlikely: E.g. :

1) Quick military defeat of UCK restores calm in Kosovo

2) Quick military defeat of JNA and other Serbian forces leads to total UCK/K.Alb. control

3) Serbia withdraws from Kosovo/grants independence

4) Negotiations lead to acceptable settlement for both sides in near term future.

5) The int'l community/NATO stands by as the whole region explodes and a greater Albania is established.

6) The UCK abandons their goals/fight and K.Albanians resume a non-violent struggle.

etc..

Which of the 3 scenarios analysed above is most likely to be approached will be decided in the near-term future, possibly over the next 3 months ?

At the moment the situation seems to be somewhere between scenario A and B. The guerilla activities of self-proclaimed UCK fighters have markedly intensified in the past few weeks, with casualties amounted to over 100 this past weekend alone (19-21 Juli 1998). However, it is far from clear whether

- the UCK has a unified command and control structure

- the UCK is strong enough to sustain activities at this level or can even expand them (as it claims it will expand activities to major towns now, even Pristina itself)

- the UCK can receive continuous support over the border with Albania, Macedonia or Montenegro and how strong this support will be.

- the UCK has an interest in large-scale engagements with high casualties and high risk of decisive defeats

- the UCK has the ability to make coordinated decisions at all.

It is thus not clear whether, militarily, the UCK possesses the means to engage in all-out war. For the conflict to reach the scale of fighting in Bosnia (> 1000 casulaties/week), certainly more resources/weapons/men in arms are needed for the UCK.

Similarly, while Serbia has far greater military power, it is unclear whether it is able and willing to employ overwhelming force at this point in an attempt to crush the UCK. Since it is unlikely to achieve this in a short period of time and the rate of defections is reportedly already high, the army and Milosevic are unlikely to opt for this gamble at this point. Rather, Milosevic could prefer his well-tested mix of JNA, special police units, and radical paramilitaries to achieve important strategic war-goals and count on the rising level of nationalism to quell internal critique and win time.

Given the low probability for the UCK to obtain independence militarily (while having raised the stakes so much that they cannot simply step back or surrender) their military leaders for now will have to settle for more modest war-goals as well (scenario B). As the UCK is recruited out of a society that is - by itself - highly fragmented by local and clan allegiances and no common leadership seems to exist up to now this could mean that parts of the UCK could start to carve out areas of influence in Kosovo they have brought under their control already now with the intention of retaining control on the local/clan level into the future. As long as all UCK factions face an overwhelming common enemy group frictions are likely to be suppressed for now, but could erupt at a later time as the struggle over scarce resources intensifies. Milosevic - being a poor strategist but a brilliant tactician - will certainly try to foster and exploit any frictions and splits among his adversaries. If this involves temporarily ceding resources or territory to one group while denying it to others, thus creating power asymetries within the Kosovo Albanian clans, groups and leaders, one should expect to see that.

The chances of moving the conflict into the direction of scenario C are slim at the moment. For a negotiated settlement to stand any chance of being accepted by the Serbian population, it seems necessary that Milosevic stays in power, the devil he is. An acceptable deal for the radicalized Kosovarians certainly involves some fundamental change in status of Kosovo. However, outright independence seems impossible to be acceptable, and would be political suicide for Milosevic - or anyone else - to put on the table. Given the potential for irredentists in Macedonia and Albania to join in the course for independence and/or a greater Albania, independence is also unacceptable for the international community. Thus an independent Kosovo would not be viable. The trick is to find a status that would meet the UCK (and now even Rugova's) demands for independence half-way, with the possibility of full independence later on. A "republican" status - that is the status of a republic like Serbia and Montenegro within the FRY seems a possibility, but certainly not yet. Some fundamental changes within Serbia, Kosovo and FRY have to take place for a negotiated solution to stand a chance. A protracted guerilla will induce a lot of changes, but hardly for the better. In the end, change has to come from within Serbia and FRY, from a disillusioned and war-fatigued population that will finally come to accept the fact that Kosovo cannot be held onto any longer. Milosevic, on the other hand, would be ready to sign away Kosovo, whenever he deems it necessary to sustain his personal power. Therefore, international pressure on Milosevic's levers on power on all levels have to be employed that will force him to strike a deal, just as it did in signing the Dayton agreement (not before the war was in danger of being lost on the ground) and in accepting the municipal election results in Serbia in 1996. This involves, depriving him of his financial assets used to buy off his cronies; reducing his total control over the media and the influence of his propaganda machine; and work to split his party machine, just as it split in Montenegro between his supports around Bulatovic and his critics around Djukanovic.

At the same time maximum diplomatic and other pressure has to be applied to radical Kosovarians, in particular the UCK. It has to be clear that independence is not on the table and will not be accepted. The flow of arms and heavy weapons across the borders have to be stopped, if necessary by a military deployment along the border. The UCK should be deprived of all funds and remittances coming from supporters in Germany and elsewhere. However, military strikes in Kosovo should only be taken with a UNSC resolution backing the intervention, and when clear goals - including a plan of post-fighting peace building have been agreed upon.

Michael Jandl

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